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Lifting the Curse of the SOX Through Employee 
Assessments of the Internal Control Environment 
Thuy-Nga T. Vo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1919, eight Chicago White Sox baseball players allegedly 
participated in a scheme to intentionally lose games during the World 
Series.1  For this misdeed, some say the White Sox were subjected to a 
curse whereby the team was unable to win a World Series title for 
eighty-six years.2  The scandal so tainted the White Sox that their 
affliction became known as the curse of the Black Sox.3  Not until 
2005 was the team able to lift the curse of the Black Sox by winning the 
World Series title over the Houston Astros.4 
In 1920, the Boston Red Sox baseball teams owner sold Babe Ruth 
to the New York Yankees.5  This sale, some say, was such a 
controversial move that it subjected the Red Sox to their own curse 
whereby the team was unable to win a World Series title.6  The curse was 
dubbed the curse of the Bambino after the nickname of the baseball 
legend involved in the sale.7  Eighty-four years after the sale, the curse of  
 
                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; 
B.A., summa cum laude, University of Minnesota.  In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I was 
formerly the Director of Finance and a member of the SOX Compliance Committee of a Fortune 500 
company.  I am grateful for the helpful comments on this article offered by Professor Donald 
Langevoort of Georgetown University Law Center, as well as by my colleagues Daniel Kleinberger, 
Kenneth Port, Niels Schaumann, and Deborah Schmedemann.  I thank Michael A. Duffy, Esq., for 
his insights and support. 
 1. See generally ELIOT ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT (Henry Holt & Co. 1987) (1963) (presenting 
a reconstruction of the Black Sox scandal). 
 2. See David Thigpen, Every Year, a Miracle, TIME, Oct. 31, 2005, at 75 (blaming Chicago 
baseball teams failure to win a World Series in eighty-eight years in part on the Black Sox (the 
team that threw the 1919 Series)). 
 3. See id. (comparing Chicagos streak without a title to that of the Boston Red Sox, whose 
curse-crushing triumph [in 2004] proved that nobody can lose forever). 
 4. See Editorial, An 88-Year Wait, Ended, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A12. 
 5. DAN SHAUGHNESSY, REVERSING THE CURSE: INSIDE THE 2004 BOSTON RED SOX 2, 23 
(2005). 
 6. See id. at 23. 
 7. See id. at 2, 810. 
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the Bambino was finally lifted when the Red Sox defeated the St. Louis 
Cardinals in the 2004 World Series.8 
The curse of the SOX (the business worlds acronym for the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)9 also arose out of scandals and controversy.  
The curse began when Congress passed SOX in response to well-
publicized corporate failures and accounting fraud at Enron, WorldCom, 
Tyco, and other large public companies.10  As this Article will discuss, 
the curse of SOX has subjected public companies to a host of legislative 
and regulatory requirements and caused public companies to incur 
unanticipated opportunity and monetary costs. 
The most challenging provision of SOX has been section 404 (SOX 
404),11 which requires public companies to establish and conduct an 
assessment of their internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR).12  
In addition to requiring senior management to report on the effectiveness 
of ICFR, SOX 404 mandates that public companies obtain external 
auditor attestations to senior managements assessments.13  Although the 
legislation was enacted in 2002, application of SOX 404 has been 
delayed repeatedly for nearly half of all domestic public companies due 
to the outcry over the lack of implementation guidance and the 
substantial compliance costs.14 
This Article posits that the opportunity and monetary costs imposed 
on the corporate world by the curse of SOX can be lifted in much less 
time than it took to lift the curses that plagued the Red Sox and White 
Sox, and that the goals behind the legislation can be more effectively 
achieved.  Instead of implementing SOX 404 by requiring management 
to conduct an assessment of the companys internal accounting controls, 
SOX 404 should be implemented by requiring the company to conduct 
an assessment of its internal control environment.  Assessment of the 
internal control environment can be achieved by having employees 
assess and report on senior managements behavior and ethics.  
Employee assessments of managements behavior and ethics will be 
                                                     
 8. Id. at 12. 
 9. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 
U.S.C.). 
 10. E.g., ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 17 (2006); 
ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 58990 (9th ed. 2005); ARTHUR R. 
PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 130 (2d ed. 2004). 
 11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004). 
 12. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a). 
 13. Id. § 7262(b). 
 14. See infra Parts II.C., III.A. 
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more effective in improving financial reporting quality and corporate 
integrity than the management assessments of internal accounting 
controls currently interpreted to be required under SOX 404. 
Part II of this Article examines the legislative and regulatory 
background of SOX 404, including the internal control systems required 
under this statutory provision and the ensuing regulatory guidance to 
public companies to comply therewith.  Part III examines the resulting 
opportunity and monetary costs of compliance, and reveals that these 
costs are high and have resulted from lack of regulatory guidance and 
public companies misdirected focus on the minutiae of internal 
accounting controls instead of the overall internal control environment.  
Part IV determines that implementation of SOX 404 and regulatory 
guidance missed the goals of improving financial accuracy and corporate 
integrity, because reform efforts focusing on internal control activities 
are ineffective at assessing and improving corporate behavior.  Part V 
proposes a new method of assessing and improving organizational 
integrityemployee assessments of management ethics. 
This Article concludes that an employee assessment and reporting of 
senior managements behavior and ethics is a cheaper and more effective 
method of detecting financial reporting fraud and improving corporate 
behavior than the current implementation of SOX 404s requirement of a 
management assessment and reporting of ICFR.  By requiring public 
companies to conduct and report employee assessments of executive 
behavior and ethics, the curse of SOX can be lifted.  Because this form of 
assessment and reporting is a less costly and more effective method of 
determining organizational integrity and financial reporting accuracy, it 
can lift the curse of SOX in much less time than it took to lift the curses 
of the Red Sox and White Sox. 
II. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The Public Company Accounting Reform & Investor Protection Act 
of 2002, better known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 was enacted 
in reaction to well-publicized corporate failures and allegations of fraud 
in financial reporting.  The overarching purpose of SOX was to restore 
investor confidence by improving the integrity of financial reporting.16  
                                                     
 15. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 
U.S.C.). 
 16. Final Rule: Managements Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and 
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, 
Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,068, 68 Fed. Reg. 
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SOX applies to public companies, which include any company whose 
stock is publicly traded on an exchange and most companies whose stock 
is traded on the over-the-counter or pink sheet market, any company that 
has filed a registration statement to issue securities in the future, and any 
other entity that is required to file annual and quarterly reports.17 
A. Section 404 Requirements 
One of the most challenging requirements of SOX involves a 
companys responsibility to implement internal controls.  As discussed 
below, public companies have been required to establish and maintain a 
system of internal controls since passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977,18 and the concept of internal controls has been well defined 
by the accounting and auditing professions prior to the enactment of 
SOX.19  By expanding upon the longstanding requirements that public 
companies establish and maintain effective internal controls over 
financial reporting, Congress expected SOX 404 would result in more 
accurate financial statements and consequently restore investor 
confidence in the U.S. capital markets.20  Particularly noteworthy and 
controversial, SOX 404 goes beyond requiring companies to establish 
and maintain ICFR by requiring management to assess and report on the 
effectiveness of the companys ICFR.21  In addition, SOX 404 requires 
the companys external auditors, after managements assessment has 
been completed, to provide an attestation and a report on the assessment 
made by the companys management.22  These requirements imposed by 
SOX 404 have proven more onerous than anticipated, and corporations 
across the United States have felt the painful impact.23 
                                                                                                                       
36,636, 36,656 (June 18, 2003) [hereinafter Final Rule on Internal Control]; Leonard M. Baynes, 
Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of 
Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 875, 890 (2002) (explaining that SOX 
was designed to promote investor confidence by requiring disclosures of information about possible 
corporate fraud so investors could make informed investment decisions). 
 17. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 2(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 7201(7) (Supp. IV 2004) (defining 
issuer for purposes of the Act). 
 18. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 19. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 20. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN, 
MANAGEMENTS REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING AND 
CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN EXCHANGE ACT PERIODIC REPORTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS (2004), http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/controlfaq1004.htm. 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)(2). 
 22. Id. § 7262(b). 
 23. See Stephen Wagner & Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Apr. 2006, at 133, 133 (discussing the compliance burdens of SOX 404 versus the 
provisions benefits in improving financial management processes); Mark W. Olson, Chairman, Pub. 
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The rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the Commission) to implement SOX 404 provide that managements 
internal control report must be incorporated into the annual report and 
must include the following components: managements recognition of its 
responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate internal controls 
and procedures for financial reporting, the framework used by 
management in its evaluation of ICFR, managements assessment of the 
effectiveness of the companys ICFR as of the end of the companys 
most recent fiscal year, the disclosure of any material weaknesses in the 
companys ICFR identified by management, and a statement indicating 
that the external auditors have issued an attestation report on 
managements assessment of the effectiveness of the companys ICFR.24  
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Auditing Standard No. 2, 
which covers the auditors attestation to managements assessment of the 
companys ICFR, is the standard that auditors must use to satisfy their 
obligations under SOX 404.25  An external attestation of the companys 
ICFR requires the auditor to obtain an understanding of the companys 
internal control system, test and evaluate the design and operating 
effectiveness of the companys internal controls, and opine on 
managements assessment of the companys internal controls.26 
The Commission requires any public company meeting the definition 
of accelerated filer under Rule 12b-227 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 193428 (i.e., a company with equity market capitalization over $75 
million and at least one annual report filing with the Commission) to 
report annually on the companys ICFR for fiscal years ended on or after 
November 15, 2004 (amounting to a delay of five months from the 
originally proposed compliance date of June 15, 2004 and fifteen months 
from the original effective date of August 14, 2003).29  Public companies 
                                                                                                                       
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Auditor Oversight, Corporate Boards and the Benefit for Our Capital 
Markets, Speech at the National Association of Corporate Directors Annual Corporate Governance 
Conference: Driving Long-Term Value (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/ 
News_and_Events/Events/2006/Speech/10-17_Olson.aspx (expressing that addressing the costs of 
implementing SOX 404 has been on the top of the agendas of Congress, Wall Street, and 
boardrooms in the United States and abroad). 
 24. Final Rule on Internal Control, supra note 16, at 36,642. 
 25. See Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; Order Approving Proposed Auditing 
Standard No. 2, Exchange Act Release No. 49,884, 69 Fed. Reg. 35,083, 35,08384 (June 23, 2004). 
 26. Id. at 35,084. 
 27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2006). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a78nn (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 29. Managements Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of 
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8392, Exchange Act 
Release No. 49,313, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,357, 69 Fed. Reg. 9722, 972223 
(Mar. 1, 2004). 
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that are not accelerated filers are required to comply with the 
management assessment requirements for fiscal years ended on or after 
December 15, 2007, and with the auditor attestation requirements for 
fiscal years ended on or after December 15, 2008 (amounting to a delay 
of almost four years from the original compliance date of April 15, 
2005).30  The Commission estimates that approximately six thousand 
companies, or sixty percent of all registered public companies, were non-
accelerated filers as of 2005.31  Thus, more than half of all public 
companies are not yet subject to the requirements of SOX 404.  The 
continual delays in implementation of SOX 404 have been caused by 
corporate outcry over the amount of opportunity and monetary costs that 
companies have incurred in their attempt to comply with the ICFR 
requirements.32 
Public companies vociferous concerns and questions about SOX 
404, in addition to prompting the Commission to delay the compliance 
date for non-accelerated filers, have also led the Commission to establish 
an advisory committee33 to assist the Commission in evaluating the 
current regulations on disclosure, financial reporting, and internal 
controls of public companies.34  In its final report to the Commission, the 
advisory committee recommended the Commission exempt certain 
public companies with market capitalization of less than $128 million 
from both the management assessment and auditor attestation 
requirements, and exempt certain public companies with market 
capitalization between $128 million and $787 million from the auditor 
attestation requirement.35 The advisory committee suggested that the 
proposed exemption of the management assessment and auditor 
attestation requirements, which would cover nearly eighty percent of all 
                                                     
 30. Internal Control over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-
Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8760, Exchange Act 
Release No. 54,942, 71 Fed. Reg. 76,580, 76,58183 (Dec. 21, 2006). 
 31. See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-361, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: 
CONSIDERATION OF KEY PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER 
PUBLIC COMPANIES 10 (2006) [hereinafter GAO CONSIDERATION] (analyzing the compliance costs 
of SOX). 
 32. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 33. See Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8514, 
Exchange Act Release No. 50,864, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,498, 76,498 (Dec. 21, 2004). 
 34. See FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO 
THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 15 (2006), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
REPORT] (defining smaller public companies as public companies with equity market 
capitalization of approximately $787 million and less, which companies constitute 78.5% of all U.S. 
public companies and comprise 6% of total U.S. equity market capitalization). 
 35. See id. at 67. 
08 - VO FINAL II.DOC 12/10/2007  12:32:42 PM 
2007] LIFTING THE CURSE OF THE SOX 7 
domestic public companies, be in effect until the Commission issues 
adequate guidance to assist in managements performance of an 
assessment of ICFR.36  The Commission has rejected the advisory 
committees advice for exemption, stating instead that SOX 404 will 
ultimately apply to all public companies.37 
B.  Internal Controls over Financial Reporting 
Rule 13a-15(c) under the Securities Exchange Act requires an 
assessment of a companys ICFR be based on a suitable, recognized 
control framework that is established by a body or group that has 
followed due-process procedures, including the broad distribution of the 
framework for public comment.38  The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)39 has developed 
a definition of internal control that is widely accepted in the accounting 
and auditing professions.  COSO defines internal control as a process, 
effected by an entitys board of directors, management and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of objectives in the categories of effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations.40  COSOs definition has become 
the most widely used framework for establishing internal control 
structures at public companies.41 
In its rules to implement SOX 404, the Commission amended its 
definition of ICFR to align it with the definition developed by COSO.42  
Thus, Rule 13a-15(f) under the Securities Exchange Act now defines 
ICFR as a process to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial 
                                                     
 36. Id. at 67 & n.13. 
 37. Steven Marcy, Companies Continue to Ask SEC for Leniency in Section 404 Guidance, 37 
CORP. COUNS. WKLY. (BNA) 291, 291 (Sept. 27, 2006); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Commn, 
No. 2006-75, SEC Announces Next Steps for Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation (May 17, 2006), 
http://sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-75.htm [hereinafter SEC Next Steps]. 
 38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(c) (2006). 
 39. See generally COOPERS & LYBRAND, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY 
COMMN, INTERNAL CONTROLINTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1994) [hereinafter COSO INTEGRATED 
FRAMEWORK] (two-volume edition about internal control).  COSO is a private sector organization 
sponsored by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the American Accounting 
Association, the Institute of Internal Auditors, the Institute of Management Accountants, and the 
Financial Executives Institute.  COSO Homepage, http://www.coso.org (last visited Sept. 18, 2007). 
 40. COSO INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 39, Executive Summary, at 3. 
 41. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 26; DELOITTE & TOUCHE, AUDIT 
COMMITTEE RESOURCE GUIDE 2627 (2003). 
 42. See Final Rule on Internal Control, supra note 16, at 36,64041. 
08 - VO FINAL II.DOC 12/10/2007  12:32:42 PM 
8 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
statements for external purposes, and such process includes policies and 
procedures that (1) [p]ertain to the maintenance of records . . . in 
reasonable detail [to] accurately and fairly reflect . . . transactions and 
dispositions of . . . assets, (2) [p]rovide reasonable assurance that 
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial 
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, 
and that receipts and expenditures are properly authorized, and (3) 
[p]rovide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection 
of unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition of . . . assets.43  Because 
the focus of SOX 404 is on financial reporting, the Commissions 
definition of ICFR is not as broad as COSOs definition of ICFR.  The 
Commissions definition does not encompass a companys operational 
effectiveness and efficiency or its compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations, with the exception of compliance with the applicable laws 
and regulations directly related to the preparation of financial 
statements, such as the Commissions financial reporting requirements 
and the IRS tax code.44 
The COSO framework of internal control is comprised of two 
substantive components.45  One component of the internal control system 
is the control environment, which for purposes of SOX means the overall 
attitudes, values, and philosophy of senior executives and the culture 
throughout the company relating to the timeliness and accuracy of 
financial reporting.46  Elements of the control environment include 
managements integrity, ethical values, professional competence, and 
operating style.47  The other component of the internal control system is 
control activities, which for purposes of SOX are comprised of policies, 
procedures, and systems relating to the reliability of financial reporting.48  
Examples of control activities include policies regarding reconciling 
bank statements with checks issued, procedures governing the counting 
and valuation of inventory, and codes of conduct to guide employee  
 
                                                     
 43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(f) (2006). 
 44. See Final Rule on Internal Control, supra note 16, at 36,640. 
 45. See COSO INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 39, Executive Summary, at 45 
(identifying three procedural or logistical components of the internal control system, including risk 
assessment, information communication, and monitoring).  Risk assessment identifies the likelihood 
and impact of the risks faced by the company, information communication includes timely 
communication of relevant information throughout the organization in order for employees to 
perform their responsibilities, and monitoring determines whether the companys responses are 
effective against the identified risks.  Id. 
 46. See id. at 4. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
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behavior.  Of these two components, the control environment is 
considered to be the foundation of the internal control system.49 
C. Lack of Legislative and Regulatory Guidance 
SOX 404 and its implementing regulations provide scant guidance 
regarding what is required of management in its assessment of ICFR.  
Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt has commented that SOX was 
hastilyand, therefore, badlydrafted.50  In addition, large portions of 
SOX do not specify substantive rules but, instead, authorize the 
Commission to adopt implementing regulations.51  The Commission, in 
turn, has not provided definitive guidance with respect to the scope of 
managements assessment to satisfy the requirements of SOX 404.  In 
adopting its implementation rules, the Commission expressly declined to 
specify the extent of managements assessment or the amount of 
documentation and testing that management must perform.52  Rather, the 
Commission simply stated that [e]ach company is afforded the 
flexibility to design its internal control over financial reporting according 
to its own set of circumstances.53 
During the first years of implementation, the Commission held two 
roundtable discussions and invited submissions from the public to solicit 
information and craft additional guidance for the implementation of SOX 
404.54  The additional guidance, however, did not add much clarity to the 
implementation issues.  For example, additional guidance from the 
Commission included [it] is the responsibility of management to 
determine the form and level of controls appropriate for each 
organization and to scope their assessment and testing accordingly,55 
and the scope and process of the assessment should be reasonable, and  
 
 
                                                     
 49. Id. 
 50. Harvey L. Pitt, Make SOX Fit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2006, at A12. 
 51. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 52. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN, 
STAFF STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENTS REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING 3 (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/stafficreporting.pdf 
[hereinafter STAFF STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROL]. 
 53. Final Rule on Internal Control, supra note 16, at 36,659. 
 54. Concept Release Concerning Managements Reports on Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting, Exchange Act Release No. 54,122, 71 Fed. Reg. 40,866, 40,86769 (July 18, 2006) 
[hereinafter Concept Release on Internal Control]. 
 55. STAFF STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROL, supra note 52, at 23. 
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the assessment (including testing) should be supported by a reasonable 
level of evidential matter.56 
After two years of implementation, the Commission continued to 
field protests over the high costs of SOX 404 compliance and the lack of 
clarity on the scope of assessment required of management.57  As the 
business community continued to seek additional guidance from 
regulators into the third year of compliance for accelerated filers, the 
Commission held additional roundtable discussions in 2006 to gather 
input from public companies, auditors, investors, lawyers, and educators 
on how to manage the costs and implementation details of SOX 404.58 
III. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
Reaction to SOX as a whole statute has been mixed.  Supporters 
praise the strength of various provisions of the statute or the overall 
message it sends.59  Critics decry the ineffectiveness of various 
provisions of the statute and its intrusion into subject areas that 
traditionally have been within the province of the states.60  With respect 
                                                     
 56. Id. at 3. 
 57. See GAO CONSIDERATION, supra note 31, at 58 (recommending that the Commission 
assess the sufficiency of available guidance on managements assessment of internal control); SEC 
Next Steps, supra note 37 (announcing a series of actions intended to improve the implementation 
of the Section 404 internal control requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to 
comments from a variety of sources). 
 58. See Concept Release on Internal Control, supra note 54 (discussing the Commissions 
efforts to gain public comment); ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 23 (stating that 
small businesses particularly need guidance); SEC, PCAOB Roundtable on Sarbanes-Oxley Says 
Second Year Better, Guidance Needed, 74 U.S.L.W. 2677, 2677 (May 16, 2006) (noting continued 
need for clearer guidance). 
 59. See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Role of Empirical Evidence in Evaluating the Wisdom of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 823, 844 (2006) (praising SOX for providing a coherent 
core of concepts designed to strengthen the financial reporting process); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Laws Duty of Care as 
Responsibility for Systems, 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 950 (2006) (expressing that although SOX will have 
positive results generally in enhancing corporate transparency and specifically in improving 
financial reporting quality, the determination of whether the benefits are worth the costs depends on 
the intended beneficiaries of the legislation); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2003) (applauding SOX for, 
among other things, bringing various gatekeepers such as lawyers and analysts into the corporate 
governance system); Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law 
After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 516 (2002) (expressing belief that the core provisions of SOX, 
relating to auditor independence, audit committees, financial reporting, analyst conflicts of interest, 
and Commission resources, are a thoughtful and well drafted response to the corporate scandals). 
 60. See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of 
Going Private, 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 14142 (2006) (suggesting that SOXs reach beyond 
disclosure requirements into internal corporate governance may cause smaller companies to rethink 
their decision to become public); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate 
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (arguing that 
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to SOX 404 specifically, although some businesses and governmental 
agencies have expressed the belief that SOX 404 has increased public 
companies financial reporting accuracy,61 reaction to SOX 404 has been 
more uniformly critical.  The prevalent sentiment is that the benefits of 
SOX 404 are meager and difficult to measure, and that those few and 
unquantifiable benefits have been derived from substantial and tangible 
costs of compliance.62  Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, recognizing 
the economic burdens imposed by SOX 404, has summed up corporate 
Americas sentiment that SOX 404 is reviled here and abroad.63 
A. Implementation Costs 
Reports by congressional auditors and an advisory committee to the 
Commission have acknowledged that costs for public companies to 
comply with SOX 404 have been much higher than anticipated.64  
Among the costs of SOX 404 compliance have been the loss of senior 
                                                                                                                       
contract and market approaches will be more efficient in monitoring and preventing fraud than 
SOXs regulatory approaches); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 152629 (2005) (criticizing the lack of empirical 
support for SOX by citing results from studies on audit committee independence, executive loans, 
and auditors non-audit services); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as 
Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 861 (2003) (pointing 
to SOX as an example of the ascendancy of federal law in corporate governance). 
 61. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 108 n.218, 126 (indicating that some 
advocates of Section 404 have pointed to the 1200 financial restatements in 2005, doubling the 
number from 2004, as evidence of the provisions positive effect in improving financial reporting 
accuracy, while critics of Section 404 have responded by questioning why many of those companies 
who claimed effective internal controls and received clean auditor attestations in 2004 have had to 
withdraw their financial statements for restatement in 2005); FIN. EXECUTIVES INTL, FEI SURVEY 
ON SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 IMPLEMENTATION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2006), available at 
http://www2.fei.org/files/spacer.cfm?file_id=2104 (reporting that 38.4% of 274 financial executives 
believed that their companies financial reports are more accurate as a result of complying with SOX 
404); Christopher A. Myers & Kwamina Thomas Williford, SEC and PCAOB Move Toward Risk-
Based Approach to Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Compliance, 5 Corp. Couns. Wkly. (BNA) 40, 40 
(Jan. 31, 2007) (referencing reports by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and the 
Commission that SOX 404 has resulted in more accurate financial statements). 
 62. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 7, 12526 (discussing comments 
from public companies that SOX 404 provides little or no benefits); U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-06-255R, INTERNAL CONTROL: ANALYSIS OF JOINT STUDY ON ESTIMATING THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RENDERING OPINIONS ON INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING IN THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENT enclosure I, at 23 (2006) [hereinafter GAO ANALYSIS] 
(discussing significant costs from internal control opinions and difficulty in determining benefits 
from the opinions); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 29195 
(2005) (discussing five points that raise doubts about whether the benefits of SOX 404 exceed its 
costs). 
 63. Pitt, supra note 50. 
 64. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 32; see also GAO CONSIDERATION, 
supra note 31, at 1418 (comparing compliance costs of smaller and larger public companies). 
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managements time that could otherwise be spent in strategic decision-
making to maximize shareholder value, the disincentives for start-up 
companies to go public, the costs of domestic issuers going private, and 
the loss of foreign issuers who are not listing on the United States 
exchanges or are leaving the United States market.65  In addition, the 
requirements of SOX 404 have created disincentives for companies to 
undertake certain business initiatives, such as mergers, acquisitions, 
product development, and technology upgrades, because of the fear that 
those activities will entail additional accounting controls that would need 
to be implemented, documented, tested, assessed, and audited.66 
In addition to these far-reaching, unintended opportunity costs of 
SOX 404 compliance, the immediate monetary outlays for the 
management assessments and auditor attestations of ICFR have been 
painfully high.67  In its release to adopt the implementation rules for SOX 
404, the Commission estimated that the average annual cost of 
compliance over the first three years would be $91,000 per company.68  
The average annual costs actually incurred by public companies during 
the first two years of implementation, without dispute, have been 
drastically higher than anticipated. 
                                                     
 65. See GAO CONSIDERATION, supra note 31, at 17, 2126 (discussing that some companies 
attribute their decision to go private to SOX, and that some chief financial officers and accounting 
staff spend as much as ninety percent of their time on SOX 404 compliance efforts during the first 
round of SOX 404 filing); Kip Betz, NYSE CEO Expects SOX Changes to Aid Compliance Coming 
Relatively Soon, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1708, 1708 (Oct. 9, 2006) (stating that twenty-four 
out of the twenty-five largest initial public offerings in 2005 were listed on overseas exchanges); 
Carney, supra note 60, at 157 (finding that going-private filings almost doubled in the years 
following enactment of SOX, with 65 filings in 2001, 59 filings in 2002, 101 filings in 2003, and 
114 filings in 2004); Clark, supra note 62, at 294 (expressing concerns that SOX 404 has caused 
some smaller public companies to go private and other smaller companies to be deterred from going 
public); Law Professors Decry Sarbanes-Oxley as Debacle, Call for Re-Examination, 74 
U.S.L.W. 2567, 2567 (Mar. 28, 2006) (citing that in 2005, there were 129 new foreign listings on the 
London Stock Exchange, six on the New York Stock Exchange, and fourteen on the NASDAQ 
Stock Market, with almost half of the new foreign listings citing SOX as the reason they listed on the 
London Stock Exchange); Romano, supra note 60, at 158889 (finding potential loss of financing 
opportunities as SOX deters smaller companies from going public or from being acquired by larger 
public companies); Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Business Wins Its Battle to Ease a Costly 
Sarbanes-Oxley Rule, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2006, at A1 (stating that only three out of the largest 
twenty initial public offerings in the first ten months of 2006 occurred in the United States, 
compared with nine out of the largest twenty initial public offerings occurring in 2002 prior to the 
enactment of SOX). 
 66. See GAO CONSIDERATION, supra note 31, at 17 (reporting that smaller public companies 
canceled operational improvements and information technology investments); SECs Atkins 
Concerned over Proposal for Reporting Nonexecutive Compensation, 75 U.S.L.W. 2025, 2026 (July 
11, 2006) (reporting that companies have avoided acquisitions, technology upgrades, and new 
product lines). 
 67. See Final Rule on Internal Control, supra note 16, at 36,657 (recognizing the magnitude of 
the cost burdens). 
 68. Id. 
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Charles River Associates, a consulting group for the Big Four 
accounting firms,69 conducted a study of the costs to comply with SOX 
404 in the second year of implementation for the public companies 
already subject to SOX 404 requirements.70  Results showed that larger 
public companies, those with market capitalization of more than $700 
million, spent nearly $4.8 million on average to conduct the required 
management assessment and auditor attestation of ICFR.71  Smaller 
public companies, those with market capitalization between $75 million 
and $700 million, spent $860,000 on average to meet their obligations 
under SOX 404.72  These numbers reflect a decrease from year-one 
implementation costs of $8.5 million and $1.2 million (for large and 
smaller public companies, respectively), which include one-time start-up 
expenses and the learning-curve costs that typically occur with new 
reporting requirements.73  A study conducted by Financial Executives 
International, a professional association for corporate financial 
executives, showed similar results.74 
Despite the decrease in costs from the first year to the second year of 
compliance, the cost of compliance remained high.75  With first-year 
expenditures for SOX 404 compliance being much more extensive than 
the estimated $91,000, and second-year decreases being much less than 
hoped for, it is not surprising that more than eighty-five percent of public 
companies perceive the costs of SOX 404 compliance exceed the 
benefits of this regulatory reform effort.76 
B.   Wrong Focus on Internal Control Activities 
The high cost of SOX 404 compliance resulted because public 
companies focused their assessments on the wrong component of internal 
                                                     
 69. The Big Four accounting firms are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & 
Young, and KPMG.  CRA INTL, SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 COSTS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
ISSUES: SPRING 2006 SURVEY UPDATE 2 (2006), available at http://www.s-oxinternalcontrolinfo. 
com/pdfs/CRA_III.pdf. 
 70. See id. at 2 (providing data on the companies total audit fees, which are comprised of fees 
for the financial statement audit, the Section 404 audit of internal control, and other audit services). 
 71. Id. at 23. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 3, 13 (listing reasons cited for the decline in year-two implementation costs). 
 74. See FIN. EXECUTIVES INTL, supra note 61 (finding average accelerated-filer company 
expenditures of $3.8 million in 2005 to comply with SOX 404). 
 75. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 3233; SEC, PCAOB Roundtable on 
Sarbanes-Oxley Says Second Year Better, Guidance Needed, supra note 58, at 2678; Scannell & 
Solomon, supra note 65. 
 76. FIN. EXECUTIVES INTL, supra note 61. 
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control.  This misdirected focus stemmed from a lack of legislative and 
regulatory guidance,77 as well as public companies desire to demonstrate 
compliance with the rules of SOX 404 while giving short shrift to the 
principles and purposes behind the legislation.  The lack of practical 
guidance from policymakers and regulators, along with the directive 
from the Commission that each company has the responsibility to 
determine the form and level of internal controls appropriate for its 
own circumstances,78 led public companies to focus on the control 
activities component instead of the control environment component of 
the internal control system in their attempts to comply with SOX 404. 
SOX was enacted in response to the corporate malfeasance that 
exposed material weaknesses in public companies internal control 
systems.79  But which component of the internal control system failed?  
In order to know what needs to be fixed to avoid more accounting 
scandals in the future, it is necessary to determine whether it was the 
failure of the control activities or the control environment that led to the 
corporate ethics scandals that prompted enactment of SOX.  The 
corporate fraud that prompted the SOX legislation resulted from a 
breakdown of the control environment, the component that is the 
foundation of the internal control system. 
The control environment of an organization includes the overall 
integrity, attitudes, values, and operating style of senior management 
regarding their responsibility to provide timely and accurate financial 
reports.80  These top-level soft controls are designed to check the 
behavior of management in the executive suites; they are not the low-
level control activities, such as account reconciliation and inventory 
counting, designed to guide the daily activities of ground floor 
employees.  In Enron and other corporate scandals, it was the executives 
who manipulated financial disclosures to investors and improperly 
enriched themselves in various ways.81  The financial manipulations and 
unjust enrichment did not happen by accident or incompetence.82  They 
                                                     
 77. See supra Part II.C. 
 78. See STAFF STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROL, supra note 52, at 23. 
 79. See Olson, supra note 23 (discussing that in passing SOX, Congress recognized the need to 
increase focus on internal controls over financial reporting and corporate governance). 
 80. See supra Part II.B. 
 81. See Clark, supra note 62, at 295 (attributing scandals at Enron and WorldCom to aggressive 
or irresponsible accounting decisions made by high-level people at those organizations).  See 
generally ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. 
Dharan eds., 2004) (collecting works by various scholars and experts in the field of corporate 
governance). 
 82. See ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 81, at XIXIII 
(Enron connotes extreme greed and extreme cunning.); Clark, supra note 62, at 295. 
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happened through intentionally orchestrated action taken by savvy senior 
management.83  These business leaders shortcoming was not a lack of 
due care in establishing internal control activities, or a lack of knowledge 
about the intricacies of accounting rules, but a lack of basic business 
integrity demonstrated by bypassing internal control procedures and 
ignoring accounting principles.84 
Unfortunately, management has for the most part been focusing 
heavily on internal accounting activities and paying little attention to the 
overall internal control environment in developing and implementing 
internal controls designed to comply with SOX 404.85  The time and 
costs that have been expended by public companies were incurred in 
accounting control documentation (i.e., identifying, documenting, and 
mapping existing accounting activities to internal control objectives), 
accounting control testing (i.e., drafting test scripts, performing testing of 
accounting activities, and identifying and documenting internal control 
design and operating deficiencies), and accounting control remediation 
(i.e., developing deficiency remediation plans, designing and 
documenting internal controls to address deficiencies, and retesting 
accounting activities).86 
The work product of SOX compliance efforts includes internal 
control grids identifying accounting activities and objectives, flowcharts 
and narratives covering key activities that affect financial statements, and 
testing worksheets for identifying deficiencies in the design and 
operation of accounting controls.87  The grids, narratives, flowcharts, and 
                                                     
 83. See Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enronthe Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 81, at 3, 1317 (discussing the background events and circumstances 
surrounding the collapse of Enron). 
 84. See id.; Cheryl Rosen, Ethics After Enron, BUS. ETHICS, Summer 2006, at 22, 25 (pointing 
out that Enron had a state-of-the-art ethics program); Dennis Nally, Chairman and Senior Partner, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Remarks at the Denver Forum and the City Club of San Diego (Jan. 56, 
2006), available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/ncpressrelease.nsf/docid/61B76019FE4646DE 
852570ED00606C21 (opining that Enron executives and accountants focused on accounting rules 
and ignored accounting principles). 
 85. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 23 (discussing problems companies 
generally encounter in complying with SOX 404); Clark, supra note 62, at 29195 (discussing costs 
of SOX 404 compliance); Wagner & Dittmar, supra note 23, at 13537 (discussing approaches to 
SOX compliance). 
 86. See Concept Release on Internal Control, supra note 54, at 40,86973; PRICEWATERHOUSE 
COOPERS, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: SECTION 404 PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR MANAGEMENT 4575 
(2004) [hereinafter PWC PRACTICAL GUIDANCE] (discussing the methodology of internal control 
documenting, testing, evaluation, and reporting); GAO CONSIDERATION, supra note 31, at 17; Clark, 
supra note 62, at 29195; Wagner & Dittmar, supra note 23, at 13537. 
 87. This information is based on the personal experience of the author, who served as the 
Director of Finance and a member of the SOX Compliance Committee of a Fortune 500 company 
[hereinafter Author Experience].  See also PWC PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 93105 
(providing examples). 
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worksheets are detailed and lengthy, identifying the specific steps and 
individuals involved in each activity.  For example, the control grids, 
narratives, and flowcharts for paying an invoice may include the 
following details: procedures for the request, authorization, and issuance 
of a purchase order; steps for the receiving and recording of products into 
the inventory system; procedures for the receipt and posting of the 
invoice on the accounts payable systems; processes for performing a 
three-way match between the purchase order, the receiving report, and 
the invoice to ensure the accuracy and validity of product received and 
invoice pricing; procedures for making and approving a disbursement 
request; steps to verify the identity and validity of the vendor prior to 
issuance of the disbursement; and procedures to record the disbursement 
on the accounting systems.88 
These detailed narratives, flowcharts, and documentation have to be 
created for all key activities that affect the financial statements, 
including, for example, activities in the areas of inventory, fixed assets, 
procurement, order processing, freight, accounts payable, accounts 
receivable, product costing, and payroll.89  Company personnel are 
required to review the narratives, flowcharts, and control grids to ensure 
that the company follows the processes that are documented for each 
accounting control, and that all of the identified accounting controls are 
in fact in place and operating.90  Employees are also required to test and 
document, on a periodic basis, all internal accounting controls that have 
been identified.91 
The focus on internal control activities instead of the internal control 
environment has led public companies to identify, document, and test an 
excessive number of low-level accounting controls.92  External auditors, 
in their procedures to conduct an audit and attestation of managements 
                                                     
 88. Author Experience, supra note 87; see also PWC PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 
93105. 
 89. Author Experience, supra note 87; see also PWC PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 
93105; Carney, supra note 60, at 14445 (discussing the involvement of employees from various 
areas of the company in the internal control assessment process). 
 90. See Concept Release on Internal Control, supra note 54, at 40,86973; PWC PRACTICAL 
GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 5668 (discussing methods to determine whether internal controls are 
operating); Carney, supra note 60, at 14445; Wagner & Dittmar, supra note 23, at 13537. 
 91. See sources cited supra note 90. 
 92. See Concept Release on Internal Control, supra note 54, at 40,86973; DELOITTE, 
ACHIEVING SOX COST REDUCTIONS THROUGH CONTROLS RATIONALIZATION: MOVING TOWARDS 
A LEAN AND BALANCED APPROACH IN 2006, at 2, http://jobfunctions.bnet.com/whitepaper.aspx? 
&docid=237809&promo=100510 [hereinafter LEAN AND BALANCED] (registration and login 
required) (discussing poll reporting 62% of participants admit having too many controls over 
routine areas); ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 136; STAFF STATEMENT ON 
INTERNAL CONTROL, supra note 52, at 45. 
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assessment as required by SOX 404, have also been focusing on the 
minutiae of control activities and requiring management to account for 
controls such as who attended meetings and who has access to office 
keys. 93  The result is that auditors have identified, in one case, over 
60,000 internal controls for management to document and test.94  
Managements approach to identifying, documenting, and testing the 
low-level accounting activities has caused the large and unexpected costs 
of SOX 404 compliance.95  Businesses are spending millions of dollars to 
hire consultants and employees and to implement new computer systems 
to manage reams of data about internal control activities, on top of the 
millions of dollars that the companies pay to the external auditors to 
audit and attest to everything management has done.96 
The Commission has stated its belief that the high costs of SOX 404 
implementation have been due to the mechanical, and even overly 
cautious way that management has approached SOX 404 in a bottom-
up, check-the-box approach to assessing internal control over financial 
reporting.97  So instead of focusing on the top-level soft controls in the 
control environment that are aimed at curbing abuses carried out by 
company executives, the same abuses SOX 404 was designed to 
dissuade, public companies have been devoting their time and resources 
to the massive number of low-level accounting controls designed to 
guide the daily operation of line-level employees.  Public companies 
focus on internal control activities has been taken nearly to the exclusion 
of any assessment of the internal control environment.98 
                                                     
 93. See Clark, supra note 62, at 294 (reciting examples of auditor recommendations arising 
from SOX 404 reviews to include documenting every call from employees to the technical help 
centers and proving appropriate controls over all office keys); Langevoort, supra note 59, at 966 
(noting anecdotal evidence showing audit firms have interpreted SOX 404s requirement for auditor 
attestation broadly, resulting in auditors focusing on time-consuming but revenue-generating tasks); 
Scannell & Solomon, supra note 65 (noting that auditors fear of lawsuits by investors or the 
Commission has prompted auditors to identify excessive numbers of key internal controls). 
 94. Scannell & Soloman, supra note 65. 
 95. See Concept Release on Internal Control, supra note 54, at 40,87071; Clark, supra note 
62, at 29395; Scannell & Solomon, supra note 65; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Commn, No. 
2005-74, Commission Statement on Implementation of Internal Control Reporting Requirements 
(May 16, 2005), http://sec.gov/news/press/2005-74.htm [hereinafter SEC Statement on 
Implementation]. 
 96. See sources cited supra note 95. 
 97. SEC Statement on Implementation, supra note 95; see also SEC Next Steps, supra note 37 
(noting that management assessments under Section 404 have not fully reflected the top-down, risk-
based approach). 
 98. See SEC, PCAOB Roundtable on Sarbanes-Oxley Says Second Year Better, Guidance 
Needed, supra note 58, at 2679 (reporting panelists calls for more risk-based controls); DELOITTE, 
ARTICLE: CORPORATE CULTURE AND THE CONTROL ENVIRONMENT: A CULTURAL ASSESSMENT 
LEADS TO STRONG INTERNAL CONTROL (2006), http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,1002,sid% 
253D5601%2526cid%253D35751,00.html (noting many compliance projects focus on internal 
 
08 - VO FINAL II.DOC 12/10/2007  12:32:42 PM 
18 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
The selection of internal control activities as the focus of 
managements assessment is understandable.  The Commissions rules 
require managements assessment of ICFR to include documentation and 
testing of ICFR.99  It is practical and achievable to document that the 
company has the requisite accounting activities in place, and that the 
accounting controls are performing as intended.  Take, for example, the 
accounting control of segregation of duties.  It is logistically simple to 
document that job responsibilities have been divided so that no 
individual employee has the duty or opportunity to both authorize and 
initiate a transaction, and it is also feasible to verify that transactions 
have in fact been initiated by the proper employee with the authorization 
of another employee at the appropriate level of authority.100  Focusing on 
internal control activities may entail much time and costs to public 
companies because of the sheer volume of possible accounting controls, 
but the process of identifying, documenting, and testing internal control 
activities can be practicably and demonstrably implemented because of 
the concrete and tangible nature of accounting controls. 
The internal control environment and its associated soft controls are, 
however, difficult to document and test.101  How do companies document 
or test whether ethical fundamentals about financial reporting are 
operating at the senior management level?  How do companies test 
whether their top leaders have the moral compass to steer in the right 
direction ethically while operating the business, executing profit 
strategies, and reporting financial results?  The existence of codes of 
conduct and ethics training at companies cannot in themselves provide 
evidence that internal controls will be applied or that they will be 
effective against senior management overrides in situations of extreme 
pressure to meet internal projections and external market expectations.102  
Not only would it be logistically difficult to document and test the ethics 
of senior management, but it would also be career suicide for specific 
employees to perform the unenviable task of documenting and reporting 
on the ethics of their senior management in the way that specific 
                                                                                                                       
control, often overlooking the control environment). 
 99. Final Rule on Internal Control, supra note 16, at 36,643. 
 100. See Clark, supra note 62, at 29495 (giving examples of low-level controls); Carney, supra 
note 60, at 147 (noting increased demand for separation of functions); PWC PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, 
supra note 86, at 108 (presenting hypothetical assessment finding inadequate segregation of duties). 
 101. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 2324 (noting companies with more 
limited resources, fewer personnel, and less revenue are more likely to rely on undocumented and 
untested controls). 
 102. See KPMG FORENSIC, KPMG, INTEGRITY SURVEY 20052006, at 6 (2005), available at 
http://www.us.kpmg.com/RutUS_prod/Documents/9/ForIntegritySurv_WEB.pdf (attributing man-
agement misconduct to pressure to meet business targets and overriding of company policies). 
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employees are currently performing the task of documenting and 
reporting on the effectiveness of various internal accounting activities. 
IV. REFORMS FOCUSING ON CONTROL ACTIVITIES ARE INEFFECTIVE IN 
IMPROVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 
Various attempts at reform have focused on preventing corporate 
misconduct through structural mechanismsprocesses and activities that 
can be objectively identified and quantified, such as ethics training, 
compliance committees, and accounting policies and procedures.  Past 
reform efforts that have imposed requirements for structural 
mechanisms, which are similar to SOXs current focus on internal 
accounting activities, have not been successful in enhancing financial 
reporting accuracy or improving corporate integrity. 
A. Reform Efforts Prior to SOX 
Congress, the Commission, and the United States Sentencing 
Commission have mandated various structures and processes in their past 
reform efforts.  The United States Sentencing Guidelines for 
Organizations, for example, has identified specific steps organizations 
can take to receive a reduction in fines and penalties in the event they are 
found guilty of violating federal criminal laws.103  These steps include 
establishing standards of ethical conduct, conducting training on 
standards of conduct, and establishing an ethics office or system for 
employees to report or seek guidance regarding criminal conduct.104 
In addition, public companies have been subject to the requirement 
to keep accurate financial records and maintain a system of internal 
controls since the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
(FCPA).105  The FCPA was passed after domestic companies use of 
corporate funds for questionable or illegal payments to foreign 
government officers became public knowledge and shook faith and trust 
in the integrity of our corporate sector.106  As part of Congresss effort 
to restore the loss of faith and trust in corporate America arising out of 
the bribery payments, the FCPA included a requirement that public 
                                                     
 103. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 8, introductory cmt. (2005). 
 104. Id. § 8B2.1. 
 105. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 106. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Exchange Act Release No. 17,500, 46 Fed. Reg. 
11,544, 11,545 (Feb. 9, 1981). 
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companies establish a system of internal controls to safeguard corporate 
assets, maintain appropriate authorization procedures for corporate 
transactions, and ensure accuracy of financial records.107 
The Commission issued a policy statement several years after 
passage of the FCPA to communicate its view that public companies, as 
a result of experiencing high anxiety over the broad language of the 
internal accounting control provision of the FCPA, had been overly 
cautious in ensuring technical compliance with the FCPA and had 
diverted corporate resources to create a burdensome system that did not 
necessarily reflect the principles embodied in the FCPA.108  The 
Commission, in extolling business leaders not to limit themselves to 
nominal gestures of compliance with the requirement to establish an 
internal accounting control system, but instead to assume management 
responsibility to foster integrity within the corporate environment, 
recognized that regardless of how strong a companys internal 
accounting controls are on paper, the internal control activities 
themselves will not be effective to achieve the Acts objective in the 
absence of a control environment that promotes integrity in financial 
reporting.109 
B. Reform Efforts Under SOX 
SOX 404 and its implementation rules, in addition to reiterating the 
need for public companies to establish an internal accounting control 
system, added more layers of processes to the FCPA by requiring 
management to assess and report on the companys system of internal 
controls and requiring auditors to conduct an audit and attestation of 
managements assessment.110  In light of the failure of past regulatory 
efforts to enhance financial reporting accuracy and corporate integrity 
through internal control requirements similar to those that are now in 
SOX 404, and the similar mode of burdensome implementation of the 
internal control requirements, those who expect SOX 404 to achieve its 
objective of restoring investor confidence and improving financial 
accuracy are bound to be disappointed.  Indeed, the regulators 
themselves have acknowledged that although past reform efforts may 
have communicated the demand for transparency, accuracy, and 
timeliness in financial reporting, the requirements for structural 
                                                     
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2000). 
 108. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, supra note 106, at 11,544. 
 109. Id. at 11,547. 
 110. See supra Part II.A. 
08 - VO FINAL II.DOC 12/10/2007  12:32:42 PM 
2007] LIFTING THE CURSE OF THE SOX 21 
mechanisms such as accounting policies and procedures alone have not 
been fully effective in fostering management accountability.111 
The Commission has recognized that public companies current 
approach to SOX 404 compliance has included excessive, duplicative or 
misfocused efforts and that any approach that treats all controls equally 
is less likely to improve internal controls and financial reporting.112  The 
Commission, however, has continued its attempt to reign in accounting 
fraud by focusing on internal accounting activities instead of redirecting 
the focus to the internal control environment.  The Commissions answer 
to the excessive, duplicative, and misdirected compliance efforts has 
been to advise companies to focus on controls related to those processes 
and classes of transactions for financial statement accounts and 
disclosures that are most likely to have a material impact on the 
companys financial statements.113  Thus, in the Commissions view, the 
focus of managements assessment of ICFR should continue to be on the 
internal accounting activities, but not the multitude of unimportant 
accounting activities that are currently being applied.  Instead, the 
Commission believes the focus of managements assessment of ICFR 
should be on relevant accounting activities that are likely to have a 
material impact on the financial statements.114 
Although the Commissions approach to limiting SOX 404 
requirements to material accounting processes and transactions will 
alleviate some of the cost burdens of SOX 404, continuing the focus on 
internal accounting activities still leaves the internal control environment 
unaddressed.  The Commission has thus far bypassed the opportunity to 
specify that company assessment of senior managements integrity, 
ethical values, professional competence, and operating style with respect 
to financial reporting is most needed under SOX 404.  These are the 
elements of the internal control environment, and these are the elements 
that influence and direct public companies financial reporting.  Failure 
of the control environment is the cause of the corporate corruption that 
prompted the enactment of SOX, and failure to assess the control 
environment will not get to the root causes of fraudulent financial 
reporting and corporate misbehavior. 
                                                     
 111. See GAO ANALYSIS, supra note 62, at 13. 
 112. SEC Statement on Implementation, supra note 95. 
 113. STAFF STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROL, supra note 52, at 6. 
 114. Id.; see also Rachel McTague, SEC Proposes Interpretive Guidance for Managements 
Assessment of Controls, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2107, 2107 (Dec. 18, 2006) (discussing the 
Commissions proposed interpretive guidance that managements assessments of ICFR should be 
based on materiality, with the primary thrust of the guidance to reduce costs). 
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C. Effect of Reform Efforts 
Congress, in requiring public companies to perform a management 
assessment and auditor attestation of the effectiveness of internal control 
systems, expected that the market would punish companies that report 
material weakness115 in their internal control systems.  In theory, 
investors should flee these stocks, depressing offending companies 
stock prices.116  The effect of SOX on investor confidence, however, has 
been questioned from the beginning of the statutes enactment.117  
Moreover, several years after the passage of SOX, it appears either that 
investors are not aware of information about companies material 
weaknesses in internal control activities, or are aware of the accounting 
weaknesses but are not letting those internal control failures affect their 
investment decisions.118  Although stock prices of some companies lost 
ground after disclosure of material weaknesses in internal accounting  
 
 
                                                     
 115. Many Material Weaknesses Relate to Taxes, Cox Reports, 74 U.S.L.W. 2502, 2502 (Feb. 
28, 2006) (stating that [n]early a third of companies that have reported material weaknesses in their 
internal controls [cited] at least one . . . weakness[] . . . relat[ing] to income taxes, with the causes 
including inadequate application of generally accepted accounting principles for income taxes, 
inadequate documentation to support the amounts recorded for such things as valuation allowances 
and foreign subsidiaries, inadequate controls on calculations and reconciliations, and inadequate 
policies and procedures to review complex or non-routine transactions); SEC, PCAOB Roundtable 
on Sarbanes-Oxley Says Second Year Better, Guidance Needed, supra note 58, at 267778 
(reporting that 16% of 3900 accelerated filers reported a total of 1500 material weaknesses in year 
one of implementation, and 7% of 3000 accelerated filers reported a total of 400 material 
weaknesses through April 25, 2006 for year two of implementation). 
 116. See STAFF STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROL, supra note 52, at 10 (The Commissions 
rule implementing [SOX] 404 was thus intended to bring information about material weaknesses in 
internal control over financial reporting into public view.). 
 117. See Law Professors Decry Sarbanes-Oxley As Debacle, Call for Re-Examination, supra 
note 65, at 2567 (pointing out that between the time that the public heard about the WorldCom 
scandal and President Bushs statement advocating stronger legislation to combat corporate fraud, 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average gained about 150 points; on the day of the Presidents statement, 
however, the Dow dropped 179 points; and when the Senate passed SOX a day later, the Dow fell an 
additional 282 points); Romano, supra note 60, at 154648 (doubting that the upward movement of 
the market in July 2002 was a result of the markets positive assessment of the enactment of SOX, 
by pointing out that although the year-long downward slide of the daily closing price of the S&P 500 
composite index ceased after the conference committee reported a SOX bill in July 2002, the upward 
climb was only temporary as the S&P in October 2002 was back to the low level that it was at in 
July 2002). 
 118. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 14041 (discussing the publics 
continuing investment in companies that are not yet subject to Section 404 requirements as evidence 
that investors do not care about Section 404 protections); Langevoort, supra note 59, at 96263 
(questioning the relationship between disclosure of internal financial reporting controls and 
securities prices). 
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controls,119 the stock prices of other companies were unaffected or even 
increased after disclosure of such weaknesses.120 
Although recent reform measures may have positively influenced 
corporate behavior, managerial abuse remains prevalent.  The Sentencing 
Guidelines and FCPA did not prevent the scandals that prompted SOX, 
and SOX did not dissuade the managerial improprieties seen since the 
enactment of that legislation.  In addition to the accounting schemes that 
have been uncovered at various companies,121 the longstanding abuses in 
the mutual fund industry continued after passage of SOX and came to 
light in 2003.122  Past corporate reforms also did not succeed in 
preventing or inducing discontinuance of the longstanding practice of 
backdating executive stock options, which came to public attention in 
2005 and has resulted in a succession of corporate chiefs resigning in 
disgrace.123 
                                                     
 119. David Reilly, Checks on Internal Controls Pay Off, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2006, at C3 (citing 
a study by research firm Lord & Benoit showing that companies that reported no material 
weaknesses in either 2004 or 2005 had an average gain of 27.7% in share price during the two years 
ending on March 31, 2006, compared with a 17.7% gain for the Russell 3000 share index, while 
companies that reported material weaknesses in both 2004 and 2005 experienced a decline of 5.7% 
in share prices). 
 120. See DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, INTERNAL CONTROL DISCLOSURES: KEY TRENDS TO 
WATCH (2005) (on file with author) (citing analysis of data from Compliance Weeks April 12, 2005 
issue, which showed that of the 116 companies that disclosed material weaknesses, the impact of the 
disclosure on the companies stock prices that is not explainable by random variation and overall 
market direction were as follows: the median price change was 0%; the mean price change decreased 
by 0.3%; the stock price of eighteen companies decreased by more than 5%; and the stock price of 
eighteen companies increased by more than 5%); Dave Beal, H.B. Fuller Lauds Sarbanes-Oxley, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 21, 2006, at 1D.  In late 2004, H.B. Fuller, a Minnesota-based adhesives 
and specialty chemicals maker, discovered discrepancies in its financial statements.  On January 11, 
2005, Fuller announced it would have to delay its annual financial report.  When Fuller filed its 
annual report on February 25, 2005, Fuller disclosed details of weaknesses in its accounting controls 
and also restated its profits for the most recent three quarters as well as the most recent fiscal year 
2004.  After the disclosure of internal control weaknesses, Fullers stock, which had been mostly in 
the twenty- to thirty-dollar range for years, began to climb.  During the year after disclosure of its 
internal control weaknesses and before getting a clean assessment for 2005, Fullers stock reached a 
five-year high.  Beal, supra. 
 121. See Jennifer Bjorhus, Ex-CEO Admits Raiding Buca Till, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June 8, 
2006, at 1A (Bucas top officers created a tone at the top and a corporate culture that allowed them 
to loot the company and engage in financial fraud. (quoting Linda Thomsen, SEC director of 
enforcement)); James M. Pethokoukis et al., AIG Fesses Up, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 11, 
2005, at 36, 36 (reporting that AIG admitted to accounting irregularities intended to artificially 
support its stock price). 
 122. See Richard A. Booth, Who Should Recover What for Late Trading and Market Timing, 1 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 101, 10424 (2006) (discussing abusive trading practices in the mutual fund 
industry and how to address the harms suffered by mutual fund investors); Tamar Frankel, How Did 
We Get into This Mess?, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 133, 13338 (2006) (discussing the change in mutual 
fund advisory services from a profession and fiduciary service to a business and sales service). 
 123. See Cox: SEC Probing Over 100 Cases Involving Reporting; New Rules Halt Slide, 38 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1567, 1567 (Sept. 18, 2006) (backdating stock options involves 
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By fixating on documenting, testing, and remediating the numerous 
internal control activities, corporate America is tied up in demonstrating 
compliance with the rules that do not address the causes of fraudulent 
accounting practices.  SOX was enacted to mollify the countrys shock 
and disbelief over the fraudulent accounting practices of Enron, 
WorldCom, and other rogue corporations.  The irony is that Enron 
executives were able to identify accounting rules to justify their financial 
disclosures, even though the picture of financial health that they 
portrayed by following those rules was distorted.124  Enron executives 
used the available accounting rules to mask the deteriorating conditions 
of the company.125  The accounting rules in those cases did not ensure 
that the executives would carry out their corporate and ethical 
responsibilities of truthful disclosure.  Similarly, requiring management 
to assess and report on internal control activities, the same accounting 
policies and procedures that have been required to be in place since 
1977, will not ensure that executives will carry out their ethical 
obligations of timely and accurate financial accounting. 
V. ASSESSING THE CONTROL ENVIRONMENT AS A NEW APPROACH TO 
CORPORATE REFORM 
Policymakers, when legislating and regulating to manage corporate 
misbehavior, impose various structural requirements.  They mandate that 
public companies create compliance committees, implement ethics 
programs, establish codes of conduct, provide diversity training, and 
establish accounting control activities.  The effectiveness of these 
structural fixes has been less than expected, as seen from the failure of 
past reform measures to prevent the corporate shenanigans of more 
recent years.  Structural reforms do not constitute a comprehensive and 
effective cure for corporate ailments.  In the same way that having a code 
                                                                                                                       
misrepresenting the date that an option is granted so that it appears to be awarded at a time when 
the underlying stock price is at a low point, [thus] maximizing the potential profit to be gained when 
the stock option is exercised at a later date); SEC Is Probing More than 100 Cases Involving 
Possible Fraud in Option Reporting, 75 U.S.L.W. 2135, 2136 (Sept. 12, 2006) (recognizing that 
although SOX requires real-time reporting of stock option grants, backdating has continued where 
options are filed late and not in compliance with statutory requirements). 
 124. See Edward J. Janger, Brandeis, Business Ethics, and Enron, in ENRON: CORPORATE 
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 81, at 63, 6465 (summarizing Enrons manipulation 
of legitimate structured financing arrangements and malleable accounting rules for off-balance-sheet 
treatment of entities); Van Niel, supra note 83, at 1314 (citing Enron executives violation of the 
principles underlying accounting rules for special purpose entities and mark-to-market transactions); 
Nally, supra note 84 (opining that Enron executives and accountants found precise [accounting] 
rules to justify the disclosures they made in the financial statements). 
 125. See Nally, supra note 84. 
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of law cannot by itself ensure legal behavior, merely having a code of 
ethics by itself cannot ensure ethical behavior.  The policies, programs, 
and processes that are part of a companys internal control activities can 
be an effective secondary defense, but a strong internal control 
environment must be the first defense against fraudulent financial 
reporting and unethical corporate behavior.126 
In imposing structural requirements, policymakers avoid asking the 
questions that are core to the problems of management corruption and 
financial reporting fraud, such as how do we get business leaders to 
internalize an ethical mindset that will permeate and infuse the corporate 
environment with ethical behavior?  How do we get business executives 
to accept the responsibility to cultivate organizational integrity not only 
by verbally expounding but also by actually demonstrating high ethical 
behavior?  To ask these questions is to leave the realm of objective, 
verifiable structural efforts, and enter the subjective, murky world of 
ethical principles, moral compunction, and human behavior. 
A. The Need to Assess the Control Environment 
As currently interpreted and implemented, SOX 404 compliance 
means following the letter of the law that mandates the documentation 
and testing of ICFR.  By limiting the scope of ICFR to the more easily 
documented and objectively testable internal accounting activities, 
business leaders demonstrate their compliance with the letter of the law 
to protect themselves from liability.  Focusing on the letter of the law to 
document and test control activities, however, detracts attention from the 
more important objectives of evaluating and improving the behavior and 
ethics of management and the organization as a whole.127 
Organizational integrity is more than the internal mechanisms, rules, 
and procedures established by business leaders; it must also include an 
evaluation of senior managements commitment and steadfastness to the 
principles underlying those mechanisms, rules, and procedures.  As the 
Commission has said, not all internal controls are equal, and public 
companies should not be devoting their time and resources to internal 
controls that are not material to the financial statements.128  However, the 
Commissions position that public companies should focus only on 
                                                     
 126. See Wagner & Dittmar, supra note 23, at 135. 
 127. See Langevoort, supra note 59, at 966 (predicting that control audits would focus on time-
consuming tasks such as documentation and testing, while leaving intact management autonomy in 
areas with high risk of managerial opportunism). 
 128. See STAFF STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROL, supra note 52, at 56. 
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internal control activities that are likely to have a material impact on the 
financial statements129 will fall short of the Commissions goal of 
preventing financial fraud.  The Commission can best achieve SOX 
404s goal of financial reporting accuracy and fraud prevention by 
requiring public companies to assess the internal control environment of 
the companythe environment in which senior management operates 
and perpetuates its approach to financial reporting and public 
disclosure.130 
Establishing internal control activities without more will not secure 
executive adherence to those controls.  Instead, senior management has 
the ability to override or bypass these internal control activities, thereby 
rendering ineffective the very internal control activities that they 
established.131  Merely establishing an ethics program under the 
Sentencing Guidelines132 or adopting a code of ethics under Section 406 
of SOX133 is not likely to decrease the likelihood that unethical managers 
will override controls.134  As the Antifraud Programs and Controls Task 
Force of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has 
advised, [m]any financial statement frauds have been perpetrated by 
intentional override by senior management of what might otherwise 
appear to be effective internal controls.135 
Since the passage of SOX, the number of employees in positions of 
managing ethics and compliance programs has increased 
exponentially.136  Although most large organizations established formal 
ethics or legal compliance programs prior to the enactment of SOX,137 
some organizations have added to their compliance structure by creating 
specific Sarbanes Compliance Offices, with dozens of full-time 
employees to oversee SOX 404 compliance efforts.138  Other 
                                                     
 129. See id. 
 130. See Olson, supra note 23. 
 131. COSO INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 39, Executive Summary, at 6. 
 132. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 103, § 8B2.1. 
 133. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (Supp. IV 2004). 
 134. See ANTIFRAUD PROGRAMS & CONTROLS TASK FORCE, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. 
ACCOUNTANTS, MANAGEMENT OVERRIDE OF INTERNAL CONTROL: THE ACHILLES HEEL OF FRAUD 
PREVENTION 6 (2005), available at http://www.aicpa.org/audcommctr/download/achilles_heel.pdf. 
 135. Id. at 1. 
 136. Rosen, supra note 84, at 24 (reporting that membership in The Ethics and Compliance 
Officer Association, a professional organization for managers of ethics and compliance programs, 
has increased over 70%, to 1260 members, in the five years since the collapse of Enron). 
 137. See ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 2003: HOW EMPLOYEES VIEW 
ETHICS IN THEIR ORGANIZATION 512 (2003) [hereinafter BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY] (comparing 
organizations ethics programs between 2000 and 2003). 
 138. LEAN AND BALANCED, supra note 92, at 1. 
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organizations follow the advice of consulting firms and designate 
employees from tax, finance, accounting, legal, internal audit, 
information technology, sales, marketing, and other operational 
departments to be responsible for internal controls relating to each 
employees area of responsibility.139  The effectiveness of these ethics 
and compliance employees in preventing unethical management action 
is, however, questionable.  They likely do not have the positional stature 
or organizational influence to challenge the actions of the senior 
executives.140 
Some organizations have established ethics and compliance 
programs merely to enable company executives to check off that they 
have complied with regulatory standards such as the Sentencing 
Guidelines.141  Enron, for example, used its state-of-the-art ethics and 
compliance program as a structural front behind which the company 
concealed manipulative and fraudulent accounting practices.142  In 
addition, Enrons executives were articulate businessmen who were able 
to enunciate precepts for ethical business conduct while concealing their 
own ethical shortcomings from the outside world.143  As apparent from 
the continuing corporate malfeasance, ethical corporate behavior does 
not necessarily follow from the existence of control activities such as 
authorization policies, codes of conduct, or compliance committees.144  
Rather, organizational conduct is dictated by whether executives enforce 
authorization policies, adhere to codes of conduct, and cultivate high 
standards of corporate behavior as demonstrated in their everyday 
operation and decision-making.  The daily behavior of the business 
leaders reveals whether the companys internal controls are actually alive  
 
                                                     
 139. See PWC PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, supra note 86, at 35. 
 140. See Rosen, supra note 84, at 24. 
 141. See Linda Klebe Treviño, Out of Touch: The CEOs Role in Corporate Misbehavior, 70 
BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2005) (emphasizing the key role of the chief executive officer in 
managing corporate ethics). 
 142. See Lynne L. Dallas, Enron and Ethical Corporate Climates, in ENRON: CORPORATE 
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 81, at 187, 198 (noting that Enron had an anonymous 
hotline and a code of ethics the company required its employees to sign, and that the companys 
espoused values of Respect, Integrity, Communication, and Excellence were displayed on banners 
in the lobby of Enrons headquarters and printed on inspirational gifts to employees). 
 143. See id. at 199 (stating that Enron executives adopted a compliance-based approach to 
follow the letter of the law, rather than a values-based approach that promoted the intent of the law); 
Duane Windsor, Business Ethics at The Crooked E, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 81, at 659, 660 (noting that Enron executives motives and conduct were 
contrary to their publicly professed high ethical standards). 
 144. See Treviño, supra note 141, at 1201 (noting that establishing a formal ethics or legal 
compliance program, by itself, does not guarantee effectiveness). 
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and operating or are merely a static structure without real-life 
application.145 
As new and uncertain as it may be, we need to move beyond the 
current approach of viewing structural mechanisms as indication of, or 
motivation for, ethical corporate behavior.  The existence of structural 
mechanisms merely demonstrates compliance with the requirements to 
establish those structural mechanisms.  This is obvious from the ability 
and ingenuity of corporate executives to give all appearances of proper 
behavior through compliance with structural requirements, while 
contemporaneously executing schemes that are the antithesis of those 
very same structural mechanisms.  The meager benefits realized from 
establishing structural mechanisms reveal that we somehow need to get 
to the moral and behavioral characteristics of business leaders who 
determine and direct the action of the organization.  To obtain an 
understanding of the ethical dimensions of executives, we need to be able 
to ascertain whether executives follow the internal rules they have 
established, whether they live up to the values they expound, and 
whether they are guided by principles of business ethics that apply 
regardless of whether there are external rules under which they could 
justify questionable behavior. 
B. Conducting the Employee Assessment 
Employees, with their inside access and exposure to executive action 
on a routine basis, can be the answer to our need to understand 
executives views of their obligations to the company and its 
stakeholders, their faithfulness to the internal rules and structural 
mechanisms they purportedly establish and implement, their philosophy 
about legal compliance, and their perspective about personal rewards and 
executive entitlement.  The signals emanating from executives conduct 
in making routine decisions and resolving issues on an ongoing basis can 
be a strong indication, although admittedly not a guarantee, of how well 
their ethics and integrity will stand up when challenging situations arise 
that test their values. 
Employee assessment of senior managements ethics and integrity 
should be conducted on a company-wide basis.  The inclusion of the 
entire employee base assures a review of business leaders throughout the 
organization.  Also, the survey should cover the entire employee 
                                                     
 145. See id. at 1203, 1205 (categorizing leaders who verbally espouse ethical values but do not 
take ethical action as hypocritical leaders, whereas leaders who neither espouse nor conduct 
themselves ethically are unethical leaders). 
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population broadly in order to separate idiosyncratic views from those 
that represent the company as a whole.  An independent party outside of 
the organization should be retained to review the survey responses and 
prepare a composite profile of senior management of the company.  
Using an outside party to compile the employee responses is more likely 
to produce an overview of the organization that is unbiased by personal 
agendas and internal politics.  In these company-wide surveys, 
maintaining the anonymity of the employee making the assessment 
encourages frank reflection and disclosure.  By ensuring confidentiality, 
the survey is more likely to be successful in soliciting details that can 
identify patterns of management behavior and convey the ethical 
characteristics of the management group as a whole. 
The company-wide employee assessment that this Article proposes is 
different from the current practice of some companies in surveying the 
control environment of their organization.  Very few companies attempt 
to perform an evaluation of the organizations integrity, and those that 
attempt to gauge the ethics of their senior management do so by having 
internal employees interview the executives of the company.146  Using 
internal employees to interview executives about the executives ethics is 
an exercise in futility for the purposes of assessing, predicting, or 
preventing unethical behavior.  It is improbable that executives will 
reveal their motivation or inclination for self-enrichment and fraudulent 
conduct to the interviewer; the most that can be gained from any 
executives answers would be an understanding of her espoused 
ideology.  It also is highly unlikely that internal employees who have 
been designated to interview executives will have any political power or 
practical influence to voice concern about the integrity of their senior 
bosses. 
The overall objective of the employee assessment would be to get 
information, from the insider-employee perspective, about the attitudes, 
values, and conduct of senior management and the organizational culture 
resulting from those attitudes, values, and conduct.  The information 
obtained from the survey responses can then be communicated to the 
public.  Although tailoring specific questions that should be included in 
an employee survey is beyond the scope of this Article, the general 
themes for assessment in the survey should include, at the very least, the 
following: how the executives promote or reward themselves and other 
employees; what behaviors are endorsed or permitted at the management 
                                                     
 146. See Wagner & Dittmar, supra note 23, at 134 (referencing examples of companies that use 
their own internal auditors to conduct interviews of senior executives to illustrate the condition of 
the companies control environment). 
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and line employee levels; the companys truthfulness and fairness in 
dealing with its customers and suppliers; the companys sensitivity to 
and treatment of conflict-of-interest transactions; how senior 
management treats employees with dissenting views or those who bring 
forth concerns about wrongdoing; the attention and speed with which the 
company investigates or covers up warning signs and information about 
wrongdoings; how tightly senior management controls information 
within the organization; the timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of 
information that the company discloses externally; and the senior 
executives adherence to internal company policies and procedures as 
well as external laws and regulations.147 
Employee surveys have gained in popularity and have been used 
widely by businesses for many different purposes; the logistics of 
conducting employee assessments are not difficult.148  Various 
consulting, governance, and accounting service providers have 
understood the critical need for an assessment of their organizations 
control environment, and they have developed surveys that can be used 
as a template in the creation of a uniform tool for all companies to assess 
and report on the attitudes, values, and operating style of senior 
executives and the ethical climate of the company as a whole.149  As 
                                                     
 147. Because the focus of SOX 404 is on financial reporting, the Commissions definition of 
ICFR does not encompass a companys controls to ensure compliance with laws and regulations, 
other than laws and regulations directly related to the preparation of financial statements.  See Final 
Rule on Internal Control, supra note 16, at 36,640.  The company-wide survey of senior executive 
behavior proposed in this Article, however, should not be limited to laws and regulations relating to 
accounting and financial statements but should include all laws and regulations applicable to the 
company. 
 148. See generally KPMG FORENSIC, supra note 102, at 2325 (describing survey containing 
155 close-ended questions to examine the risks of fraud and misconduct inside organizations and the 
effectiveness of programs and controls to mitigate those risks); EMERGE International, Frequently 
Asked Questions About the Cultural Health Indicator, http://www.emergeinternational. 
com/content/CHI_FAQS.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2007) (describing survey that consists of several 
open-ended questions and lists of statements to address nine dimensions of organizational culture: 
leadership, relationships, communication, infrastructure, involvement and decision-making, change 
management, finance, cultural descriptions, and general climate); Opinion Research Corporation, 
U.S. Market Research and Advisory Services, http://www.opinionresearch.com/us/about.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2007) (providing surveys in corporate branding, customer loyalty, market analytics, 
and organizational diagnostics); The Business Research Lab, Employee Surveys, 
http://www.busreslab.com/employeesurveys.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2007) (including surveys on 
employee satisfaction, productivity, diversity, culture, health and safety, and internal customers); 
Watson Wyatt, Data Services, http://watsonwyatt.com/services/servicerender.asp?ID=16496 (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2007) (collecting, analyzing, and publishing data on compensation, benefits, and 
employment practices). 
 149. See Ethics Resource Center, ERC Surveys and Benchmarking, http://www.ethics.org/ 
research/surveys-and-benchmarking.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2007); The Business Research Lab, 
Corporate Ethics Surveys, http://www.busreslab.com/ethics-surveys.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 
2007); Watson Wyatt, Services: Human Capital/Organization Effectiveness, http://www. 
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discussed above, a challenge that survey providers have faced has been 
to convince senior management to conduct an assessment of their own 
integrity, and then to conduct the survey in such a way that the results do 
not merely reflect the espoused views of senior management. 
Questionnaires developed by providers of ethics surveys are a good 
starting place for formulating questions that should be included in a 
standard form employee assessment to be conducted by all public 
companies.  Currently available surveys include questions in which 
employees are asked to rank the level of their agreement or disagreement 
with statements relating to managements commitment to comply with 
laws and regulations applicable to the companys business, the extent to 
which management embraces ethical values in their conduct beyond 
mere compliance with laws, the consistency between the statements and 
actions of management, the likelihood of retaliation by management for 
employee reporting of questionable conduct, managements level of 
tolerance for unethical behavior, the likelihood and consistency with 
which management disciplines unethical behavior, managements 
willingness to listen and respond appropriately to problems or bad news, 
the employees feeling of pressure from other employees and 
management to behave in an unethical manner, and the frequency with 
which the employee witnesses questionable behavior on the part of other 
employees and management.150  The risk of unethical behavior on the 
part of an organization can be assessed by understanding, through culling 
the employee responses to a well developed set of survey questions, how 
employees view their managements standards of integrity and 
dedication to ethical fundamentals. 
Employee assessments can be conducted at a very small financial 
cost compared to the current expenditures by public companies to 
comply with SOX 404.  The charges by service providers vary, ranging 
upward from five dollars to seventy-five dollars per employee 
surveyed.151  Pricing for employee surveys depends on the number of 
                                                                                                                       
watsonwyatt.com/services/servicerender.asp?ID=10517 (last visited Aug. 17, 2007). 
 150. See DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, CORPORATE CULTURE AND THE CONTROL 
ENVIRONMENT: THE FOUNDATION OF INTERNAL CONTROL (2004), available at http://www. 
deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_assur_ethicsCulture.pdf; EMERGE INTL, CULTURAL HEALTH 
INDICATOR REPORT: SAMPLE REPORT, available at http://www.emergeinternational.com/pdf/ 
ExampleReport.pdf; BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY, supra note 137; KPMG FORENSIC, supra note 102; 
LRN, LRN ETHICS STUDY: THE EFFECT OF ETHICS ON ABILITY TO ATTRACT, RETAIN AND ENGAGE 
EMPLOYEES (2006) [hereinafter LRN ETHICS STUDY]. 
 151. See E-mail from Gregg Campa, The Business Research Lab, to Deborah Hackerson, 
Reference Librarian, William Mitchell College of Law (Dec. 12, 2006, 4:05 p.m.) (on file with 
author); E-mail from Lizz Pellet, CEO, EMERGE International, to Deborah Hackerson, Reference 
Librarian, William Mitchell College of Law (Oct. 20, 2006, 2:42 p.m.) (on file with author). 
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participants, the collection methodology (i.e., web-based, paper, or 
combination), the number of data sorts, the number of charts and graphs, 
and the extent of written commentary highlighting strengths and 
weaknesses.152  Overall, the pricing for employee surveys, even for those 
public companies with the largest employee bases, will not likely exceed 
the $91,000 that the Commission estimated as the average annual cost of 
SOX 404 compliance.  The costs for conducting employee surveys will 
definitely be much less than the millions of dollars the average public 
company is spending to assess internal accounting activities. 
C. Employee Assessments Are Effective in Evaluating Corporate 
Behavior 
Stakeholders are interested in corporate integrity.  As the companys 
primary stakeholder, the investors heightened concern over 
organizational ethics and social responsibility is demonstrated in their 
increased interest in the ethical and social dimensions of investment 
opportunities.153  Investment portfolios that pick companies based on 
their ethical or social reflection towards issues such as employment 
opportunity, diversity, religion, human rights, health and safety, and 
environmental protection have gained more attention and more 
popularity in recent years.154  In the past decade, assets involved in 
[socially responsible] investing have risen four percent faster than all 
professionally managed investment assets in the United States, and the 
number of socially responsible investment choices has almost quadrupled 
from 55 mutual funds in 1995 to 201 mutual funds in 2005.155 
The heightened concern about corporate conduct is also reflected in 
the increased popularity and attention to corporate rankings on ethical 
and social responsibility scales.  Numerous organizations conduct annual 
evaluations and rank companies based on factors such as community 
service, workplace democracy, gender and racial diversity, and 
                                                     
 152. See sources cited supra note 151. 
 153. See generally SOC. INV. FORUM, 2005 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 10-YEAR REVIEW ivvi (2006) (summarizing the scope and scale of 
socially responsible investing from 1995 to 2005). 
 154. See id. at 23 (defining social investing, ethical investing, mission-based investing, or 
socially aware investing as an investing approach focusing on open and transparent business 
practices that are based on ethical values and respect for employees, communities, and the 
environment (quoting Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum)). 
 155. Id. at 1, 7.  Socially responsible investment portfolios used screening, shareholder 
advocacy, and community investing to deploy the $2.3 trillion under professional management in 
2005.  Id. at 1. 
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environmental stewardship.156  Prompted by frequent revelations of 
market manipulation and other corrupt behavior by corporate actors, 
various industry, investor, and international groups also have crafted 
guidelines for corporate conduct.  Examples of these guidelines include 
the Caux Round Table Principles for Business, the Interfaith Center on 
Corporate Responsibilitys Principles for Global Corporate Respon-
sibility, the United Nations Global Compact, the Consumer Charter for 
Global Business, the Fundamental ILO Conventions, and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.157  While these various 
corporate rankings and guidelines may differ in focusing on particular 
industries158 or protecting specific constituencies,159 they all reflect the 
same increasing concerns about fundamental business ethics and the 
apparent need for tools to promote corporate responsibility. 
The proliferation of social investment portfolios, ethics and social 
responsibility rankings, and corporate conduct guidelines reflects the 
publics desire for more information and influence into the 
organizational integrity of corporate America.  These attempts to glimpse 
into the ethical psyche of the company demonstrate that investors care 
not only about the end results of their investments, but also the integrity 
with which the company goes about achieving those results.  The 
rankings and ratings conducted by investment portfolios, business 
organizations, and industry groups, however, are seen from the outsiders 
view.  These views are formed primarily by outsiders looking at the 
structural mechanisms present at the company, such as the existence of 
codes of conduct and the establishment of ethics training programs.  
Although some of the ratings and rankings from external reviewers might 
reflect interviews and comments from a handful of internal employees, 
most of these interviews are of corporate executives or the employees 
responsible for creating and overseeing ethics programs.160  These 
                                                     
 156. See Peter Asmus, 17th Annual Business Ethics Awards, BUS. ETHICS, Fall 2005, at 15, 15
20 (mentioning Business Ethics magazines ranking of one hundred companies for being good 
corporate citizens and profiling companies winning awards in categories based on the companies 
corporate social responsibility management, workplace democracy, environmental excellence, and 
community service); Julie Forster, When Nurturing Works, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 26, 
2006, at 1C (discussing Working Mother magazines ranking of the top one hundred places to work, 
based on compensation of women, leave time for new parents, child care and adoption assistance, 
elder care assistance, and flexibility in work schedules and telecommuting). 
 157. Lynn Paine et al., Up to Code: Does Your Companys Conduct Meet World-Class 
Standards?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2005, at 122, 12224. 
 158. See id. at 12628 (describing the differences between various codes). 
 159. See, e.g., Forster, supra note 156 (discussing ranking of family-friendly employers). 
 160. See Asmus, supra note 156 (including interviews conducted with executives and 
compliance officers). 
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individuals objectivity may be tempered, and their views, if not biased, 
may not capture the perspectives or experiences of the entire employee 
base.  Indeed, research has shown that views of organizational ethics are 
rosier at the top, with executives expressing more satisfaction than lower 
level employees regarding their organizations response to reporting of 
ethical violations, the level of honesty at the company, and 
managements accountability for ethical misconduct.161 
Corporate ethics and organizational integrity are concerns among 
customers and employees as well.  A companys ethical reputation 
affects the purchasing decisions of customers.  Nearly 75% of people 
expressed a preference for making purchases from companies with 
ethical business practices rather than from companies with questionable 
business practices, even when the prices of the ethical company are 
higher than the prices of the company with questionable practices.162  In 
addition, 94% of employees expressed that it is critical or important 
that their corporate employer is ethical, and 82% of employees indicated 
that they would prefer to be paid less and work for a company with 
ethical business practices than receive higher pay at a company with 
questionable ethics.163 
Not only do investors and employees have a common concern for 
ethical corporate behavior, they also have a mutual financial interest.  
Investors are interested in profits undiminished by senior management 
self-enrichment or corporate bankruptcy, and employees are interested in 
job continuity164 and pension benefits165 unaffected by senior 
management self-enrichment or corporate bankruptcy.  These common 
concerns and common interests provide powerful incentive for internal 
                                                     
 161. BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY, supra note 137, at 47, 51, 53; see also Treviño, supra note 141, 
at 120809 (noting that senior managers have more positive perceptions of the companys ethics 
when compared to the perceptions of non-management employees). 
 162. LRN Ethics Study: Ethics Impact on Purchase and Investment Decisions, http://www.lrn. 
com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=122&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=174 
(registration and login required) (last visited Aug. 22, 2007). 
 163. LRN ETHICS STUDY, supra note 150, at 1. 
 164. See BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY, supra note 137, at v (stating young employees concerns 
that unethical actions of top executives will jeopardize their job security). 
 165. See Steven Harmon Wilson, Malefactors of Great Wealth: A Short History of Aggressive 
Accounting, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 81, at 41, 41 
(stating that Enrons collapse resulted in thousands of employees losing their jobs and retirement 
savings); Daniel Altman, Experts Say Diversify, but Many Plans Rely Heavily on Company Stock, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, § 1, at 26 (reporting that Enron employees who participated in the 
companys 401(k) plan invested their money mostly or entirely in Enron stock); Gretchen 
Morgenson, Beware Those One-Note 401(k)s, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, § 3, at 1 (noting that about 
12,000 Enron employees participated in the companys 401(k) retirement plan, which was loaded 
with Enron stock and which became virtually worthless upon the companys collapse). 
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employees to provide external investors with information on the ethical 
climate and behavioral manifestations of senior management.  Senior 
managements primary responsibility is to foster and protect 
organizational integrity, and stakeholders need an objective assurance of 
the companys adherence to fundamental business ethics.  As internal 
stakeholders, employees can provide external stakeholders, including 
investors, customers, vendors, and lenders, with an assessment of senior 
managements ethical standards in their business practices. 
Senior management sends signals to employees through everyday 
conduct in managing and operating the organization.  This everyday 
conduct is more demonstrative of senior managements integrity than the 
structural mechanisms the executives put into place to demonstrate 
compliance with legal requirements.  The everyday actions of those who 
lead the organization indicate more of their propensity for committing 
fraud than the reports that senior managers are required to provide 
regarding the companys internal accounting controls.  Employees have 
the best access and exposure to the decisions and actions of management 
on a routine basis, and these internal stakeholders can provide an 
assessment of managements affinity for ethical behavior or inclination 
for ethical lapses. 
D. Employee Assessments Are Effective in Improving Corporate 
Behavior 
A study conducted by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiner 
(ACFE)166 provides strong support that requiring companies to conduct 
employee assessments of managements behavior and ethics will be 
more effective in improving corporate behavior than requiring 
management to conduct assessments of internal accounting controls.  The 
ACFE study reveals that in cases of fraud causing one million dollars or 
more in losses to the organization, companies discovered the fraud 43% 
of the time through a tip, 25% of the time through internal audits, 18% of 
the time by accident, 16% of the time by external audits, and only 8% of 
the time by internal accounting controls.167  This data shows internal  
 
                                                     
 166. ASSN OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, 2004 REPORT TO THE NATION ON OCCUPATIONAL 
FRAUD AND ABUSE (2004), available at http://www.acfe.com/documents/2004RttN.pdf.  The 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners is an industry group that provides anti-fraud education, 
training, and examination.  Id. at ii.  The organization has over 30,000 members world-wide and 
provides anti-fraud education materials to over 180 universities.  Id. 
 167. Id. at 21. 
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controls are less effective as a fraud detection tool than the voluntary 
provision of information through a tip. 
Furthermore, whereas fraud committed by non-management 
employees caused a median loss of $62,000, fraudulent schemes 
involving executives caused a median loss of $900,000.168  Although the 
losses caused by executives were high, frauds detected by internal 
accounting controls tended to involve small losses with a median of 
$40,000,169 and only 6% of executive fraud was detected through internal 
accounting controls.170  In contrast, 43% of million-dollar schemes were 
revealed through a tip,171 51% of executive fraud was discovered through 
a tip,172 and 60% of the tips about fraudulent schemes were provided by 
employees.173 
Results from the ACFE study show the limited effect of internal 
accounting controls in detecting large-dollar and high-level frauds,174 the 
very kind of fraud that prompted the enactment of SOX and that SOX 
404 was meant to deter.  It is also evident from this study that employees 
have information that can provide a measurement of the ethical behavior 
of company leaders, and tapping this information through employee 
assessments will provide a more effective way to detect and reduce 
management fraud. 
One structural mechanism that SOX requires companies to establish 
is a hotline for the anonymous reporting by employees of concerns 
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.175  A hotline for 
the anonymous reporting of fraudulent accounting activities is a worthy 
endeavor to obtain from employees information regarding specific 
instances of malfeasance by various parties inside the company.176  The 
hotline, however, is not as effective or comprehensive as a company-
wide employee assessment of the overall culture of ethics within the 
organization and senior managements loyalty to ethical standards when 
the executives are not on public display.177  To be effective in gaining 
                                                     
 168. Id. at 30. 
 169. Id. at 21. 
 170. Id. at 20. 
 171. Id. at 21. 
 172. Id. at 20. 
 173. Id. at 19. 
 174. Id. at iv. 
 175. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 176. See BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY, supra note 137, at 39 (concluding that investigations of 
business scandals reveal that organizations could have limited the extent of unethical conduct by 
heeding the warnings from internal whistleblowers). 
 177. See ANTIFRAUD PROGRAMS & CONTROLS TASK FORCE, supra note 134, at 6, 1112 
(stating that employees may be reluctant to communicate through the whistleblower program, 
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information about illegal or fraudulent activities, the hotline relies on 
employees to take the initiative in reporting information about specific 
circumstances that create concern or knowledge by the employee that an 
illegal or fraudulent activity has occurred.178  Individual initiative, 
however, is often lacking as employees are likely to experience social 
pressure to remain silent about wrongdoing by their supervisors and 
colleagues.179  Unless specifically asked to provide information, 
employees are unlikely to volunteer their views or perceptions about 
senior managements ethical lapses.180 
In addition, employees often do not know whether an activity or 
action by senior management violates any internal requirements or 
external regulations such that it should be reported or even how it should 
be reported.181  An employee assessment, on the other hand, can provide 
employees with specific questions that will cull information about 
behaviors that indicate legal improprieties or ethical lapses from their 
experience inside the company and their exposure to management.  
Survey administrators have learned from experience that employees who 
respond that they have not observed misconduct when the question is 
                                                                                                                       
suggesting that the companys audit company should be routinely furnished with the results of 
employee surveys regarding corporate behavior, and encouraging audit committee members to 
establish communication with employees below the senior management level in order to monitor 
senior management behavior and control management overrides). 
 178. In addition to the mechanism for anonymous reporting, SOX also provides protection for 
corporate whistleblowers.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 
2004).  SOX prohibits employers from taking retaliatory action against employees who provide 
information or assist in an investigation of conduct that the employees reasonably believe constitutes 
a violation of federal securities laws.  Id.  Although the statute purports to provide protection to 
employees who report of fraudulent activities, the likely success of a whistleblowers reprisal lawsuit 
against an employer under SOX remains to be seen.  See Baynes, supra note 16, at 891 (citing 
success rate of 2533% for reprisal lawsuits under federal whistleblower statutes).  Moreover, 
SOXs goal of promoting employee reporting of fraudulent activities may be modest because of the 
limited substantive nature of the statute, which protects only the reporting of securities fraud and not 
other kinds of wrongdoing.  See id. (stating that a whistleblower in a case involving a non-securities 
related offense must rely on the vagaries of state law).  The statute also requires whistleblowers to 
fulfill numerous procedural steps for protection, including the showing of adverse employment 
action and filing an administrative claim with the Secretary of Labor within ninety days of the 
discriminatory act.  See id. at 890. 
 179. See BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY, supra note 137, at 39, 42, 4546 (citing fear of not being 
viewed as team players and instead being labeled as snitches or troublemakers as a reason 
why employees do not report misconduct). 
 180. See Dov Seidman, The Case for Ethical Leadership, http://www.lrn.com/index2.php? 
option=com_content&task=view&id=129&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=174 (registration and login 
required) (last visited Aug. 17, 2007).  Dov Seidman is CEO and Chairman of LRN, a national 
provider of legal, compliance, ethics management, and corporate governance services.  About LRN, 
http://www.lrn.com/about_lrn (last visited Aug. 23, 2007); Seidman, supra. 
 181. See BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY, supra note 137, at 27, 4243 (citing cynicism that nothing 
will be done and lack of knowledge about whom to contact or how to report the misconduct as 
reasons why employees do not report misconduct). 
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phrased in general terms will often respond affirmatively that they have 
observed misconduct when the question is specific about the form of 
misconduct in question.182 
A company-wide employee assessment will solicit information from 
the employee group as a whole, without asking individual employees to 
step forward.  Broad coverage of the employee base provides comfort to 
those employees who fear they will be identified if they are the only ones 
expressing their opinions through a hotline instead of being part of the 
entire employee population being surveyed.183  The anonymity of the 
survey takers and the compilation of results across the company will also 
decrease the fear of retaliation or ostracism for speaking out, and thus 
increase the likelihood of frank disclosure.184  Recent scandals have 
heightened employees awareness that they must report evidence of 
illegal and unethical behavior or risk losing not only their current source 
of livelihood, but also their accumulated assets for retirement.185  
Requiring public companies to conduct annual employee assessments 
and to report the results publicly will provide employees with a 
functional and effective process to evaluate the integrity of senior 
leadership and the ethical culture of the company. 
A potential limitation on utilizing employee surveys to assess 
organizational ethics is that employees may fear that they will jeopardize 
the success of the company by speaking out on management misdeeds.  
If this fear leads employees to under-report managements unethical 
conduct, results from the employee assessment may be biased in a 
positive direction.  A counterweight to the potential for under-reporting 
is that the employees have to assess the perceived risks from disclosing 
management improprieties against the risks that management 
misconduct, if it remains untold, will cause the depletion of the 
companys resources through executive self-enrichment.  Worse yet, 
                                                     
 182. See id. at 28 (listing specific types of misconduct used in survey questions, including: 
Abusive or intimidating behavior toward employees; Lying to or withholding information from 
employees, customers, vendors or the public; Discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, 
age, or similar categories; Stealing, theft, or related fraud; Sexual harassment; Falsifying 
financial records and reports; and Giving or accepting bribes, kickbacks, or inappropriate gifts). 
 183. See id. at 43 (concluding that the top two reasons given by employees for not reporting 
misconduct include the belief that no corrective action will be taken and the fear that their 
communication will not be kept confidential). 
 184. See id. at 39, 45 (concluding that younger employees are most likely to feel that 
management will retaliate or view them negatively if they report misconduct); KPMG FORENSIC, 
supra note 102, at 8 (reporting that approximately half of employees surveyed believed they would 
not be protected, or were unsure of their protection, from retaliation for reporting a violation of 
company standards); Treviño, supra note 141, at 1209 (stating that employees are hesitant to report 
unfavorable information because they fear retaliation). 
 185. See sources cited supra note 165. 
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management corruption may lead to the total collapse of the company 
similar to the demise of the companies involved in the accounting 
schemes that prompted SOX or the scandals that have come to light since 
passage of SOX. 
By conducting an employee assessment and reporting the results to 
the public, the company can provide information regarding senior 
managements attitude and behavior with respect to compliance with 
external laws and regulations as well as internal policies and procedures.  
Employee assessments can expose those executives who merely pay lip 
service to ethics and legal compliance by establishing the required code 
of conduct or following the technical wording of the accounting rules, 
while sidestepping the purposes and principles of those very same ethics 
codes and accounting requirements. 
An employee assessment of management behavior can also reveal 
the tendency of management to override the policies and procedures that 
they declare have been established and implemented at the company.  
Executives who tout their companys effective internal control system, 
but then are discovered to have been committing financial accounting 
frauds or unjustly enriching themselves, are likely to have been 
overriding the companys policies, procedures, and programs.186  These 
are the business leaders who establish the required structural 
mechanisms, such as policies against conflict-of-interest transactions, but 
then override these same conflicts policies when it comes to their own 
conduct.187 
Internal control activities, such as segregation of duties and 
authorization policies, cannot in themselves curb management 
misbehavior because executives can simply override these controls.188  
Executives can initiate conflict-of-interest transactions, direct how those 
transactions will be accounted on the companys books, and then 
determine the extent and details of public disclosure of those 
transactions.  Employees who have the opportunity to work with 
executives on a routine basis can expose senior managements ethics and 
integrity by revealing whether the executives apply the internal policies 
and procedures, as well as external laws and requirements, equally to all 
                                                     
 186. See ASSN OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, supra note 166, at iv (More effective types 
of internal controls are needed to detect fraud, especially larger frauds that may involve senior 
personnel overriding or circumventing traditional internal controls.). 
 187. See KPMG FORENSIC, supra note 102, at 56 (reporting that misconduct particularly 
relevant at the management level includes abusing or misappropriating corporate assets, engaging in 
conflict-of-interest transactions, and falsifying financial records, and attributing such misconduct to 
pressure to meet business targets and override of company policies). 
 188. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 37. 
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corporate employees, or whether the executives instead carve out 
generous exceptions when it comes to applying the policies and 
requirements to their own behavior. 
Conducting employee assessments and reporting the results of 
organizational integrity can create reputational value.189  Executives are 
motivated by reputational value, especially when that reputation reflects 
personal attributes such as ethics and integrity.190  Reporting a weakness 
in the companys accounting control mechanisms does not call into 
question the personal characteristics of the executives, whereas reporting 
a weak review of organizational ethics brings to the forefront the 
executives style of leadership and personal commitment to business 
integrity.191  The employee assessment, in its role as a certification of the 
integrity of the organization, can motivate a business to focus on 
ensuring that no ethical weakness within its executive rank will taint the 
reputation of the company as a whole.192  Reporting results of the 
employee assessment provides incentive for executives to focus on 
enhancing reputational value through ethical behavior in everyday 
business conduct. 
Business leaders can restore the investor trust lost through business 
scandals of the past years by placing ethics at the forefront of how they 
make decisions and conduct business.  By demonstrating allegiance to 
high business standards through actual decisions and conduct, executives 
communicate their integrity to internal employees who will then 
communicate the companys integrity to the public.  Conducting and 
reporting employee assessments of organizational integrity will produce 
greater corporate transparency.  That transparency may, in turn, engender 
social pressures and personal incentives to incorporate ethical 
considerations into the blinding competition for corporate profits or the 
personal quest for financial rewards.  Disclosure of the companys 
ethical climate is likely to curb management abuses, whether illegal or  
 
                                                     
 189. See BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY, supra note 137, at 39 (noting that paying more attention to 
warnings from internal whistleblowers can reduce unethical conduct and financial losses while 
protecting corporate reputation). 
 190. See Timberly Ross, Buffett Memos Preach Ethics, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 11, 2006, 
at 3C (reporting Warren Buffetts reminder to top executives at his company, Berkshire Hathaway, 
and other corporate executives that [y]ou can lose a reputation that took 37 years to build in 37 
seconds. . . . And it might take more than 37 years to build it back.). 
 191. See Treviño, supra note 141, at 1208 (noting that the image of the organization is linked 
more closely to the chief executive officers personal identity than to other employees identities). 
 192. See Ross, supra note 190 (reporting Warren Buffetts advice to the executives of his 
company against improper behavior and his warning that the companys reputation is in your 
hands). 
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merely unethical, as business leaders are motivated to cultivate and 
preserve their reputation for high business ethics. 
Finally, reporting on managements behavior through ethical 
dimensions could lead to different corporate and societal perceptions 
about the contribution of ethics to corporate performance.  An employee 
assessment of managements behavior is an effective evaluation of the 
integrity of an organization because it captures, beyond the written 
internal accounting controls, the behavior executives exhibit and the 
ethical principles they apply in operating the business organization.  
Information on senior managements behavior and ethics can convey to 
internal and external constituents the organizations actual commitment 
to, and application of, responsible business practices.  This information is 
important to investors, customers, and employees.193  Also, as past 
research has shown, companies demonstrating high standards of ethical 
conduct produce higher investment results over the long term.194  Thus, 
information that signals a companys high ethics can help the 
organization attract and retain investors, employees, and customers who 
are interested in affiliating themselves with a business that adheres to 
high standards of corporate conduct. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The curse of SOX 404 is that its implementation, in terms of time 
expended, financial resources diverted, and opportunities lost, has 
resulted in meager benefits.  Conducting and reporting employee 
assessments of organizational integrity provides a practical, cost-efficient 
strategy to bring to light, and potentially curb, abuses of managerial 
power.  Internal employees, who are exposed to senior managements 
decision-making and behavioral manifestations on a routine basis, have 
the opportunity and ability to communicate that information to external 
stakeholders who desire more knowledge of the organizations integrity.  
                                                     
 193. See supra Part V.C. 
 194. See SOC. INV. FORUM, supra note 153, at 14 (noting that research has found significant 
correlation between social performance and financial performance); WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, 
WORKUSA 2002: WEATHERING THE STORM: A STUDY OF EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS 2
3 (2002) (finding that appreciation in stock price over three years plus dividends is three times higher 
at companies where employees have high trust in senior management than at companies with low 
trust levels); News Release, Rand Corporation, Rand and LRN Establish Alliance to Create Center 
for Corporate Ethics, Law and Governance (Sept. 7, 2004), http://www.rand.org/news/ 
press.04/09.07b.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) ([T]here is growing evidence that now more than 
ever companies committed to the highest standards of conduct and ethics produce superior results 
and investment performance over the long term. (quoting Dov Seidman, chairman and CEO of 
LRN)). 
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Employee assessments of company control environments will identify 
companies and executives who pay lip service to ethics and use control 
activities such as codes of conduct and training programs as window 
dressing, and benefit companies that back up their words with actions. 
As the regulators have heard from a Commission advisory 
committee, continuing on the current course of interpreting and 
implementing SOX 404 to require management to assess and report on 
internal control activities will not make SOX 404 more effective at 
improving financial reporting or organizational integrity, and time will 
not eliminate the financial and opportunity costs of compliance.195  
Instead of living with the curse of SOX for the eighty-plus years that it 
took to lift the curses that plagued the Red Sox and the White Sox 
baseball teams for their scandals, the burdens arising from requiring 
management assessments and reporting on internal control activities can 
be lifted in short order by conducting and reporting employee 
assessments of internal control environments and management ethics. 
 
                                                     
 195. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 125. 
